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Abstract—In this paper, we examine the recent trend to-
wards in-browser mining of cryptocurrencies; in particular,
the mining of Monero through Coinhive and similar code-
bases. In this model, a user visiting a website will download
a JavaScript code that executes client-side in her browser,
mines a cryptocurrency—typically without her consent or
knowledge—and pays out the seigniorage to the website.
Websites may consciously employ this as an alternative or to
supplement advertisement revenue, may offer premium content
in exchange for mining, or may be unwittingly serving the code
as a result of a breach (in which case the seigniorage is collected
by the attacker). The cryptocurrency Monero is preferred
seemingly for its unfriendliness to large-scale ASIC mining
that would drive browser-based efforts out of the market, as
well as for its purported privacy features. In this paper, we
survey this landscape, conduct some measurements to establish
its prevalence and profitability, outline an ethical framework
for considering whether it should be classified as an attack or
business opportunity, and make suggestions for the detection,
mitigation and/or prevention of browser-based mining for non-
consenting users.
Index Terms—Cryptocurrency; Monero; Coinhive; Mining;
Bitcoin; Blockchain; Cryptojacking; Ethics
1. Introduction
Bitcoin [21] emerged almost a decade ago as an open
source project, which mushroomed into a cryptocurrency
sector collectively capitalized at over $500 billion USD1.
Every day, people new to the concept of cryptocurrencies
look for a quick and simple way to acquire some crypto-
wealth. In the early days of Bitcoin, users on their personal
computers could effortlessly acquire the currency through
mining—a process Bitcoin uses to incentivize nodes to
verify transactions as they are recoded in the blockchain.
However, a second wave of mining technology saw users
augmenting the CPU power of their computers with GPUs.
Other groups of people deployed snippets of JavaScript code
on websites that recruited their visitor’s CPU power, often
unknowingly, to mine for them as part of a bigger mining
network (i.e., a mining pool). However, both approaches
quickly became infeasible as the computing power required
1. Coinmarketcap - Global Charts - Accessed: 2017-12-14 https://
coinmarketcap.com/
Figure 1. Search interest for “browser mining” over time. Search interest
seems to have piqued during price surges, which culminated with Bitcoin
crossing $1000 USD for the first time in December 2013. Soon after
Bitcoin’s first major crash searches consistently waned until a recent large
spike, which is more than 4 times the lifetime average. The waning period
before the recent surge could be attributed to the advent of ASIC usage for
Bitcoin mining, and the surge is likely due to the revival of browser mining
for non-Bitcoin currencies that have gained a sizeable market capitalization.
to mine bitcoins grew exponentially to over 12 petahashes2.
This was due to the emergence of application-specific inte-
grated circuits (ASICs) and collective mining pools, which
continue the third wave of mining to this day [23].
As the years passed and a few key cryptocurrencies
emerged as the market leaders, the concept of browser
mining largely became forgotten. Today, the most common
way for the average person to acquire cryptocurrencies is to
purchase them. It came as a surprise to many when stories
began to circulate on popular media outlets this year about
websites mining cryptocurrencies through browsers again.
Figure 1 shows how the searches for “browser mining”
have changed since Bitcoin was launched. Websites like
The Pirate Bay [10] experimented with browser mining
as a way to add a new revenue stream, while others like
Showtime.com [40] claimed they had the code injected after
they were discovered.
This paper tells the story behind the rejuvenation of
browser-based mining. It is centred on cryptojacking (also
known as coinjacking and drive-by mining), a term coined to
refer to the invisible use of a vulnerable user’s computational
resources to mine cyptocurrencies. Technically in-browser
mining is a subset of cryptojacking, although most uses
2. Bitcoin hash rate - Accessed: 2017-11-20 https://blockchain.info/
charts/hash-rate
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of the term apply to browser-based mining. In this case,
mining happens within the client browser when the user
visits the website. We have also seen the term cryptojacking
applied to malware that mines cryptocurrencies, or in the
situation where malware renders a machine as an unwitting
participant in a botnet, and the botnet is rented for the
purposes of mining crypcurrencies (cf. [12]). The resource
consumption of in-browser cryptojacking can noticeably
degrade a computer’s performance.
2. Preliminaries and Related Work
2.1. Browser-based Mining
2.1.1. Early days. The idea of in-browser mining started in
the early days of Bitcoin. Bitcoin Plus3 is one example of a
discussion on replacing ads with Bitcoin browser miners4. It
was also argued that browser-based mining provides greater
scalability and decentralization as the barrier to entry is
lowered to any unmodified computer with an internet con-
nection. Soon after there was a rise in Bitcoin JavaScript
miners such as JSMiner (2011)5 and MineCrunch (2014)6.
MineCrunch’s visibility was increased by campaigns and the
active online presence of its developers. Based on the devel-
oper claims, MineCrunch was well optimized for Javascript,
but still worked 1.5x slower than native applications for
CPU mining (e.g., CPUMiner7). Although CPU mining
became uncompetitive with GPU and ASIC-based mining,
it remained a sandbox for botnet admins to experiment with
the thousands of CPUs at their disposal. Botnet mining has
been studied in the literature [12], [45], as well as covert
mining within enterprises and cloud environments [32].
In addition to unprofitability, browser-based mining
faced legal challenges. In May 2015, the New Jersey At-
torney General’s office reached a settlement with the devel-
opers of “Tidbit“, a browser-based Bitcoin miner. Terms of
the settlement included ceasing operations of Tidbit. Then
acting Attorney General John J. Hoffman stated “No web-
site should tap into a person’s computer processing power
without clearly notifying the person and giving them the
chance to opt out.“ [24].
2.1.2. From one CPU to ASICS and mining pools. The
first Bitcoin block mined on a GPU happened on July 18th,
2010 by a user named ArtForz [44], by using a private
mining code that he developed himself. It was not until
mid-2011 that others started implementing and releasing
3. Bitcoin For the Uninitiated: Now, A Browser-Based Mining
Client May 19th, 2011 https://www.themarysue.com/browser-based-
bitcoin-mining/
4. BitCoin browser mining as a replacement for ads
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/ieaew/bitcoin browser
mining as a replacement for ads/
5. A JavaScript Bitcoin miner https://github.com/jwhitehorn/jsMiner
6. MineCrunch, web(JS) miner with integration feature
https://cryptocurrencytalk.com/topic/24618-minecrunch-web-js-miner-
with-integration-feature/
7. CPU miner for Litecoin and Bitcoin - https://github.com/pooler/
cpuminer
open source GPU-based mining tools. These tools greatly
increased mining efficiency due to the hashing power of
a GPU and the massive parallelizing possible with multiple
GPUs (also known as mining rigs). The move from software
to hardware followed shortly after. First, programmable
FPGA chips resulting in custom-built circuits specifically
for mining8. Then by mid-2012, companies started selling
ASICs designed specifically for Bitcoin mining. After delay
of about a year in delivering ASIC products, Bitcoin mining
started transitioning from GPUs to ASICs where it remains
today. Consequently, the hashing power of the Bitcoin
network increased and the mining difficulty followed. To
illustrate the change, consider a desktop PC CPU mining
at 10 MH/s: on expectation, it will take 425 years before
mining a single block [12].
In parallel to the evolving technology, collective action
emerged through the use of mining pools. A mining pool
is a collective of individual miners. Participants receive a
slice of work for mining the current block on behalf of the
pool. If a member of the pool mines the block, the block
reward is split amongst the participants of the pool pro rata
according to their computational effort [26]. As an aside,
a very elegant protocol for reporting ‘near-solutions’ to the
pool enables participants to prove, without trust, the level
of effort they are contributing to the pool at all times. In
general, a mining pools cannot amplify earnings, they only
change their shape. An income stream from a pool is a
steady trickle, while solo-mining results in sporadic dumps
of income. The first Bitcoin block found on a mining pool
was on December 16, 2010 that was a beta implementation
of a pool operated by a user named slush.
2.2. Monero
Launched in April 2014, Monero [18] is a cryptocur-
rency alternative to Bitcoin. It purportedly offers increased
privacy by obfuscating the participants in a transaction, as
well as the amounts. This is in contrast to more popu-
lar cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum, where a
pseudonymous-but-complete transaction graph can be con-
structed from the public blockchain. Recent research has
shown Monero’s obfuscation techniques are less effective
than originally claimed [17], [14]. Since regulation on ex-
changing between cryptocurrencies is lighter than exchang-
ing cryptocurrencies for fiat money, and such services are
not geographically bound, obtaining Monero for Bitcoin and
vice versa is efficient and enables Monero to be used as a
short-term medium of exchange for Bitcoin holders. This
approach (and Monero’s acceptance) is particularly popular
on so-called dark web markets; markets that do not ban
illicit goods and services.
A second characteristic that distinguishes Monero from
Bitcoin is in the mining algorithm it uses. Monero still em-
ploys proof-of-work, specifically an algorithm called Cryp-
toNight [6]. However the computational puzzle is designed
8. Custom FPGA Board for Sale! (August 18, 2011) https://bitcointalk.
org/index.php?topic=37904.0
2014-04-18 · · ·• Monero Cryptocurrency released.
2017-09-14 · · ·• Coinhive Miner launched.
2017-09-17 · · ·• ThePirateBay caught usingcoinhive [33].
2017-09-21 · · ·• Adblockers started to block coinhivescripts.
2017-09-24 · · ·• Showtime caught runningcoinhive [40].
2017-09-25 · · ·• Coinhive clones started to appear.
2017-10-13 · · ·• PolitiFact websitecompromised [43].
2017-10-16 · · ·• Coinhive launched authedmine -authorized mining.
2017-11-23 · · ·• LiveHelpNow Hack incident [15].
2018-01-25 · · ·• Cryptojacking code found onYoutube ads [16].
2018-02-11 · · ·• UK Information Commissioner’sOffice incident [38].
TABLE 1. TIMELINE OF MONERO AND IN-BROWSER MINING REPORTS
to be memory-hard: it requires the storage of a large set of
bytes and then requires frequent reads and writes from this
memory. Such puzzles are optimized for CPUs with low-
latency memory-on-chip, and not as well suited for circuits
like FPGAs and ASICs. CrypoNight requires approximately
2MB per instance, which fits in the L3 cache of modern
processors. Over the course of the next few years, these
L3 cache sizes should become mainstream and allow more
CPUs, and thus users, to participate in Monero’s ecosystem.
It has also been shown that ASICs cannot handle more than
1MB of internal memory, which is less than the size of
memory required to calculate a new block. GPUs are also
at a disadvantage since GDDR5 memory, which are used
in modern GPUs and considered one of the fastest types of
memory, is notably slower than L3 cache [41].
2.3. Coinhive
Monero built on its early success and continued to gain
in popularity over the years, which caught the attention of
some developers who decided to revisit the idea of browser
mining. See Table 1 for a timeline of events. One of the
earliest efforts appeared in September 2017 and was called
Coinhive [5]. Soon after, a competitor named Crypto-Loot9
emerged. Both websites provided APIs10 to developers for
9. Crypto-Loot - A web Browser Miner — Traffic Miner — CoinHive
Alternative https://crypto-loot.com/
10. Application Programming Interface
implementing browser mining on their websites that used
their visitors’ CPU resources to mine Monero. A portion of
mined Monero would go back to the API developer, and
the rest would be kept by the website. Not long after their
early success, several copycats appeared such as Coin-Have
and PPoi [7] to take part in the reborn practice. It even
inspired a new coin specifically designed for browser mining
named JSECoin,11 which has yet to find an audience. These
developments took place over the course of a few weeks,
which signalled the renewed success of browser mining.
However, Coinhive’s approach as a legitimate group set it
apart from its peers and established itself as the leader in the
space. They also launched separate services such as proof-
of-work CAPTCHAs and short-links, which could be used
to prevent spam while mining Monero [5].
3. Threat Model
In-browser mining is considered as an abuse unless
user’s consent is granted. The attack surface to abuse users’
browsers through cryptojacking is broad, and there are mul-
tiple vectors where various entities can inject mining scripts
in the website’s codebase. We summarize those here.
3.1. Webmaster initiated
A website administrator can add a mining script to her
webpage, with or without informing users. Website owners
may do this to monetize their sites, especially when they
have been blacklisted or blocked by standard advertising
platforms. In one example, a researcher found Coinhive
on a large Russian website offering child pornography to
users [27]. Revenue estimates, based on the website traffic
data available, were roughly $10,000 a month after convert-
ing the value of XMR mined to USD.
3.2. Third-party services
Many websites serve active Javascript from third parties
within their own webpages. This could be ads from an
ad network, accessibility tools or tracking and analytics
services. Third parties with these privileges can inject cryp-
tojacking scripts into the sites that use them, either inten-
tionally or as a result of a breach. The first two incidents,
Coinhive was injected into the websites of Movistar12 and
Globovision13 using Google Tag Manager14. Movistar stated
that Coinhive was not put on their website by a hacker,
but instead was due to “internal error” while they were
conducting “production tests”. No statement was provided
11. JSEcoin‘s Website Cryptocurrency Mining https://jsecoin.com/
12. Movistar is a major telecommunications brand owned by Telefonica,
operating in Spain and in many Hispanic American countries https://www.
movistar.com/
13. Globovision is a 24-hour television news network in Venezuela and
Latin America http://globovision.com/
14. Google Tag Manager is a tag management system created by Google
to manage JavaScript and HTML tags used for tracking and analytics on
websites
by Globovision on why the cryptojacking scripts appeared
on their site on November 15, 2017 [36]. Another high-
profile cryptojacking case involving a Google platform oc-
curred in January 2018 when Trend Micro researchers found
advertisements containing Coinhive miner script were shown
to YouTube users in Japan, France, Taiwan, Italy, and Spain
for nearly a week [16]. Similar to Showtime, YouTube
inherently has a high average visit duration as a video
streaming site and thus is prime target for cryptojacking
operations.
3.3. Browser extensions
Cryptojacking was not limited to websites in 2017. The
Chrome extension Archive Poster remained on the Chrome
Web Store for days while silently cryptojacking an unknown
portion of their 100,000+ users. After multiple user reports,
followed by multiple news media outlets covering the issue,
the extension was removed [11]. Similar cryptojacking ex-
tensions has been identified on less popular Mozilla Firefox
add-ons as well.
3.4. Breaches
If an attacker is able to breach principle servers, web-
sites, extensions, or the scripting services they use, they
can inject cryptojacking scripts that will impact the site’s
users without the site’s knowledge or consent. For example,
a researcher found a malicious modification to webchat
system LiveHelpNow’s SDK; it resulted in unsolicited min-
ing across nearly 1500 websites using their chat support
service [15] such as retail store chains Crucial and Everlast
websites. In another example, Coinhive was found on the
political fact-checking website PolitiFact15 A compromised
JavaScript library was found to be injecting the crypto-
jacking code. The malicious code remained on the site for
at least four hours before it was removed [43]. PolitiFact
executive director stated, “Hackers were able to install their
script on the fact-checking website after discovering a mis-
configured cloud-computing server” [42].
Another recent example of such incident is a breach in
a website plugin called Browsealoud16 led to injection of
cryptojacking scripts in some United Kingdom governmen-
tal websites such as Information Commissioner‘s Office, UK
NHS services, Manchester City Council and around 4200
other websites [38]. Within the same month, cryptojacking
script was seen on Tesla and LA Times websites through
poorly secured cloud configuration [22].
3.5. Man-in-the-middle
A user’s web traffic is often routed through intermedi-
aries that may have plaintext access to content. For example,
internet service providers or free public wireless routers
15. PolitiFact: Fact-checking US politics https://politifact.com/
16. An accessibility tool to read the content aloud in multiple languages
https://www.texthelp.com/en-gb/products/browsealoud/
can inject cryptojacking scripts into non-HTTPS traffic.
Advertisement code injection has been seen in practice be-
fore [39] and there have been assertions of similar injections
of browser mining scripts at certain Starbucks free Wi-Fi
hotspots in Argentina17.
4. Measurements
4.1. Prevalence of Coinhive and alternatives
Figure 2. The number of instances of the Coinhive miner scripts found
using the query in Figure 3 in top one million websites over a three month
period beginning with the release of Coinhive in September 2017.
Based on the fact that Coinhive is the dominant website
offering in-browser mining (see Figure 4), we first focus
on measuring the prevalence of Coinhive scripts deployed
on internet sites. We use the censys.io BigQuery dataset [8]
for the top million sites indexed by Zmap18. We simply
look for the coinhive.min.js script within the body
of the website page. The query we use is in Figure 3
and the results over a two month period are provided
in Figure 2. These findings are corroborated by another
search engine, PublicWWW19, which indexes the source
code of publicly available websites. Using PublicWWW’s
dataset, over 30,000 websites were found to have the
coinhive.min.js library [20]. As seen from our data
in Figure 2, the adoption of this script was substantial in
the first days of its release. However, progress slowed down
at the same time as ad-blockers and organizations started to
block Coinhive’s website. The initial purpose of this service,
as claimed by Coinhive, was to replace ads and cover server
costs for webmasters. As the service did not require that
websites receive user consent before running the miner code,
it started to be used maliciously in users‘ browsers. This
type of usage resulted in Coinhive being included in some
company’s top-10 most wanted malware list [4].
This type of measurement will become less accurate
moving forward. Cryptojacking services are evolving to
use obfuscated JavaScript and randomized URLs to evade
detection20. An example of these methods can be found in
17. https://twitter.com/imnoah/status/936948776119537665
18. https://zmap.io
19. Search Engine for Source Code https://publicwww.com/
20. https://twitter.com/bad packets/status/940333744035999744
1 SELECT domain , tags , p80 .http_www . g e t .headers .content_language , p80 .http_www . g e t .headers .server , p80 .http . g e t .headers←↩
.x_powered_by , p80 .http . g e t .title , p80 .http_www . g e t .body as wwwbody , p80 .http . g e t .body as plainbody
2 FROM censys−io .domain_public . 20171123
3 WHERE STRPOS (p80 .http . g e t .body , coinhive . min .js ) > 0 or STRPOS (p80 .http_www . g e t .body , coinhive . min .js ) >0)
Figure 3. A BigQuery SQL query to find websites that embed the Coinhive script using a dataset of the top one million sites from censys.io.
Figure 4. Share of websites using a Javascript cryptocurrency miner, details
in Table 2
Figure 5. Share of websites using a Coinhive alternative, details in Table 2
the cryptojacking service provider called Minr. In this case,
the script is automatically obfuscated for users implementing
the code. In addition, the domain names used by Minr
frequently change to circumvent blocklists and anti-malware
software.
Coinhive has begun to be blocked by enterprises. One
example is shown in Figure 7. This blocking seems to
have sent Coinhive operators to lesser known alternatives
with the same or similar functionality. We used the same
methodology on PublicWWW dataset to find the usage of
Coinhive and its alternatives on the internet. Table 2 shows
the keywords used to identify these services. The result can
be found on Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Coinhive has also reacted by focusing on adding meth-
ods to enforce asking for user consent and legitimizing
the use of cryptojacking. It introduced another domain and
service called Authedmine, which requires user’s consent to
start mining in the browser. This service did not get the same
attention as the original service, but it did inspire discussions
regarding the ethics of such services, which is discussed
in Section 6. Using the same methodology, censys.io was
Figure 6. Google Trend over last 12 months: there has been more interest
in Coinhive than the broader, related search term “Browser mining”. Com-
paring to other services offering Monero browser mining API, Coinhive
had the advantage of being the first to offer the service.
Figure 7. Concordia university has categorized the coinhive.com website
as malicious and has blocked it.
used to measure the prevalence of AuthedMine and show
the results in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Usage of AuthedMine Miner scripts in top one million websites
since its introduction
Website Results Query Parameter
Coinhive 30611 ‘coinhive.min.js‘
JSEcoin 1131 ‘load.jsecoin.com‘
Crypto-Loot 695 ‘CryptoLoot.Anonymous‘
Minr 324 ‘minr.pw‘,‘st.kjli.fi‘,
‘abc.pema.cl‘,‘metrika.ron.si‘,
‘cdn.rove.cl‘,‘host.d-ns.ga‘,
‘static.hk.rs‘,‘hallaert.online‘,
‘cnt.statistic.date‘,‘cdn.static-cnt.bid‘
CoinImp 317 ‘www.coinimp.com/scripts/min.js‘,
‘www.hashing.win‘
ProjectPoi (PPoi) 116 ‘projectpoi.min‘
AFMiner 46 ‘afminer.com/code/miner.php‘
Papoto 42 ‘papoto.com/lib/papoto.js‘
TABLE 2. CRYPTOJACKING DATA WAS GATHERED BY TOTALLING THE
NUMBER OF WEBSITES WHICH HAD THE FOLLOWING LIBRARIES IN
THEIR SOURCE CODES, INDEXED BY PUBLICWWW BY 12/24/2017.
FIGURE 4 AND FIGURE 5 ARE VISUALIZATIONS OF THESE RESULT.
4.2. Client impact
Most cryptojacking scripts discovered were configured
to use around 25% of user’s CPU, which can be justified
as it will be under the threshold of attracting the user’s
attention, and it could be argued as fair-usage of their
hardware. During the first few days, however, there were
some reports of 100% CPU usage while visiting websites
containing these scripts [34], which can be characterized as
malicious. By default, the Coinhive JavaScript library will
use all available CPU resources. The user implementing the
script must include a throttle value to reduce the client-side
CPU usage during mining operations. We show an example
in Figure 9.
Figure 9. Comparison of CPU usage of browser without and with browser
mining enabled.
4.3. Profitability
Coinhive developers estimate a monthly revenue of
about 0.3 XMR (about $101 USD) for a website with 10-20
active miners [5]. We sought to validate this estimation with
Figure 10. Google Analytics dashboard showing the number of visitors to
a domain parking service of 11 000 domains.
a real world data set provided to us21. One of the biggest
Coinhive campaign operators is a domain parking service.
It runs Coinhive on over 11 000 parked websites. While
visits to parked domains are considerably shorter than an
average website, the data spans a period of three months and
gives some insight into the profitability of cryptojacking.
During the experimental period of about 3 months, they
accumulated 105 580 user sessions for an average of 24
seconds per session. For the period examined, the revenue
was 0.02417 XMR (Monero’s currency) which at the time
of writing is valued at $7.69 USD. Further detail is provide
in Figures 10 and 11. While an A/B test was not setup
to determine how much traditional web advertising would
have brought in, freely available web calculator tools suggest
we might expect an order or two of magnitude greater for
comparable traffic.
5. Mitigations
We discuss the ethics of cryptojacking in the next sec-
tion, but in the case of cryptojacking without user consent,
it is seems natural to us to presuppose users want to be
protected. Protection might take a few forms, which we
outline here.
5.1. Obtaining consent
Cryptojacking tools might attempt to legitimize the prac-
tice by first obtaining user consent on a service provider
level. An example of this is the Authedmine service from
Coinhive discussed previously. Malicious sites might also
opt for a service like Authedmine if it is whitelisted on its
users‘ networks and then attempt to circumvent the consent
process. For example, consent that requires a click from the
user has been shown in some circumstances to be vulnerable
to clickjacking attacks [28].
While cryptojacking is nowhere near the prevalence of
tracking cookies, eventually it might grow into a regulatory
issue where governmental bodies could use legislative ap-
proaches to obtain consent, similar to the provisions many
21. In collaboration and with thanks to Faraz Fallahi https://github.com/
fffaraz
Figure 11. Coinhive dashboard showing the earnings of a domain parking
service that runs Coinhive on 11 000 domains. Over the course of about 3
months, the operator earned 0.02417 XMR (currently $7.69 USD).
countries now use for cookies (including honouring the ‘do
not track’ HTTP header and obtaining click-based consent).
5.2. Browser-level mitigation
Browser developers have begun discussion of interven-
ing in cryptojacking22. Potential mitigations include: throt-
tling clientside scripting, warning users when clientside
scripting consumes excessive resources, and blocking the
sources of known cryptojacking scripts. Determining appro-
priate for thresholds for client-side processing that are high
enough to allow legitimate applications and low enough to
deter cryptojacking is an open research problem, as would
be the wording of any notifications to the user that would
lead the user to make an informed decision about allowing
or not allowing resource consumption (cf. SSL/TLS warn-
ings [31], [30], [1]). Browsers such as Opera, have taken a
stance against cryptojacking scripts and blocked them via
their “NoCoin” blacklist [25]. It is too early to determine
the effectiveness of using a blacklist to block such activities.
It is worth noting that some browsers might actually take
the exact opposite approach and promote (consensual) in-
browser mining, as it enables a form of monetizing websites
independent of both (1) ad networks and the user track-
ing that accompanies the current ad model, and (2) users
maintaining some form of credits or currencies for making
micropayment to websites they use(e.g., Brave Browser 23).
Browser mining has been shown to not be as efficient as
22. ‘Please consider intervention for high cpu usage js’ https://bugs.
chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=766068
23. https://brave.com
native mining applications today. Therefore, optimizations
on how browsers pass system calls to the operating system
can be made, or there can even be browsers designed
specifically to support efficient browser mining.
6. Discussion
While cryptojacking might be relatively new, it fits the
pattern of various other technologies deployed on the web
that raise ethical questions. In thinking about it, we distin-
guish a few cases: (1) the use of cryptojacking on a breached
website, (2) the use of cryptojacking by the website owner
with an attempt at obtaining user consent, and (3) the use
of cryptojacking by the website owner without obtaining
user consent. We would argue that (1) is clearly unethical;
invariant to one’s views on the ethics of hacking, we cannot
see a justification for a breach that profits the adversary
without any external benefits to anyone else.
The second case, cryptojacking after gaining user con-
sent, is controversial primarily because it is unclear if users
understand what they are consenting to, what they receive
in return (some examples might include the elimination of
ads, premium features, paywalled content, or higher defini-
tion video streams), and whether it is a fair exchange. To
understand the zeitgeist, consider a recent poll conducted by
Bleeping Computer that found: “many users said they are
OK with websites mining Monero in the background if they
don’t see ads anymore” [3]. Coinhive released AuthedMine
in recognition of the importance to many of user consent.
ThePirateBay.org [2] ran cryptojacking scripts while users
searched for torrent files without notice in their Privacy
Policy, nor any visible warning on any part of the website
that informed their users of this activity. This resulted in
a backlash against the website, which responded with the
following statement, “Do you want ads or do you want
to give away a few of your CPU cycles every time you
visit the site?” [34]. While the admins admitted to their
testing of browser mining, their notice came after it was
discovered and they ultimately removed the code. In both
auction-based and keyword-based online advertisement, the
advertiser pays the advertisement publisher to distribute
the advertisement and the advertisement publisher pays a
portion of the revenues to the website owner whom the
advertisement was shown on her website [13]. However with
in-browser mining as a replacement monetization strategy, a
more direct compensation is established with less interme-
diaries which could benefit users and sites alike.
The potential harm to users of cryptojacking is higher
energy bills, along with accelerated device degradation,
slower system performance, and a poor web experience [29],
[33]. While consent may be obtained from the user, it is
unclear if the user’s mental model of how they are paying
can be made clear to them. On the other hand, the privacy
disclosures users make in the traditional advertising model
are also intangible; it is doubtful users understand what they
are consenting to when they, for example, consent through a
banner [9] to the use of tracking cookies; and many websites
waste computational resources without consequence through
buggy scripting and unnecessary libraries. In short, the
ethics are not clear-cut and should be debated.
One webservice prone to cryptojacking is video
streaming—the longer a user is engaged on a website,
the more income can be earned through browser mining.
Showtime.com [35] and UFC.com [37] are two popular
streaming sites that were asserted by researchers to have
deployed Coinhive. Showtime has declined to comment on
how or why Coinhive was implemented on their website.
Speculation has been raised that it was injected via a
third-party analytic tool, New Relic, due to Coinhive being
found inside the New Relic code block within showtime’s
website source code. However a New Relic representative
denied these claims in a statement to The Register, “It
appears [Coinhive scripts] were added to the website by
[Showtime’s] developers.” [35]. In a statement released by
the UFC, they denied the presence of the code stating,
“[they] did not find any reference to the mentioned Coinhive
JavaScript [code]”24.
The third case is the use of cryptojacking without user
consent. Moor, in ”What is Computer Ethics?” [19] in-
troduces the concept of an invisible factor for invisible
computer operations in society. Based on his definitions, we
would classify cryptojacking that does not gain user consent
as invisible abuse: the intentional use of the invisible opera-
tions of a computer to engage in unethical conduct. Here the
cryptojacker is earning money from unaware users that are
being charged on their electricity bill. As discussed before,
we already have court cases against such activities [24] and
regulations for activities such as online user tracking [9],
which indicates the need to start discussions and regulation
on in-browser mining to fill in this policy vacuum as well.
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